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Abstract 
From the perspective of the situated conceptualization framework, the primary purpose of concepts 
is for categorizing and integrating elements of situations to support goal-directed action (including 
communication and social interaction). To the extent that important situational elements are 
categorized and integrated properly, effective goal-directed action follows.  Over time, frequent 
patterns of co-occurring concepts within situations become established in memory as situated 
conceptualizations, conditioning the conceptual system and producing habitual patterns of 
conceptual processing.  As a consequence, individual concepts are most basically represented 
within patterns of concepts that become entrained with specific kinds of physical situations.  In 
this framework, the concrete vs. abstract distinction between concepts is no longer useful, with 
two other distinctions becoming important instead:  (1) external vs. internal situational elements, 
(2) situational elements vs. situational integrations.  Whereas concepts for situational elements 
originate in distributed neural networks that provide continual feeds about components of 
situations, concepts for situational integrations originate in association areas that establish 
temporal co-occurrence relations between situational elements, both external and internal.  We 
propose that studying concepts in the context of situated action is necessary for establishing 
complete accounts of them, and that continuing to study concepts in isolation is likely to provide 
relatively incomplete and distorted accounts. 
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1.  The Importance of Studying Abstract Concepts During Situated Action 
Most typically, researchers study concepts in isolation.  A word for a concept is presented 
(or sometimes a pictured instance), and the information that becomes active is assessed with 
behavioral and/or neural measures.  From this perspective, a concept is simply the information that 
becomes active when processing cues for it.  As a consequence, theories typically focus on the 
representational structures and processes that become active for concepts cued in isolation. 
From the perspective of situated cognition, however, a concept supports the effective action 
of an embodied agent embedded in the physical and social environments (1–3).  To support situated 
action, a concept is typically coupled with its referents in the body and world, along with other 
concepts that represent additional situational elements and their integration—it doesn’t operate in 
isolation.  By situated action, we not only mean action per se, but all the cognition that supports it, 
including the comprehension of situations and the production of predictions that make human action 
possible (as discussed later in further detail; also see 4). 
If this account is correct, then what we learn from studying concepts in isolation is likely to 
be limited and perhaps distorted.  Certainly, statistical regularities are associated with concepts that 
can be viewed as Bayesian priors (5).  Nevertheless, it can be argued that priors are never fully 
context-independent or fixed, instead reflecting the evolving contexts in which they are continually 
updated.  Furthermore, priors are typically accompanied by significant amounts of potentially 
dominating, contextually relevant information.  For these reasons, researchers argue increasingly 
that studying priors in isolation and reifying them into ‘gold standard’ conceptual cores is a 
misleading practice (5–8). 
To develop more complete and powerful accounts of concepts, examining their use in 
situated action is necessary.  The use of the Visual World Paradigm offers a compelling example 
(9–12).  Studying language embedded in visual worlds typically produces findings and 
conclusions that go beyond those established from studying language in isolation.  Our theme here 
is that we will similarly establish a more complete understanding of concepts if we study them in 
the context of situated action.  To the extent that we only study the information that becomes 
active for concepts from simple cues, our understanding will continue to be limited. 
We further suggest that this conclusion is especially true for abstract concepts.  As we will 
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propose, the sophisticated situated action that humans perform is not possible without abstract 
concepts (4).  Abstract concepts integrate situations in ways that are essential for comprehending 
what is happening in a situation, making accurate predictions about what is likely to occur, and 
selecting actions that yield desirable outcomes.1 
2.  The Situated Conceptualization Framework 
The situated conceptualization framework offers one possible account of conceptual 
processing during situated action (13–17).  Its basic assumptions are as follows:  First, the primary 
function of the conceptual system is to support situated action.  To do so, it constructs a situated 
conceptualization to categorize and explain the current situation, to predict likely events in it, and to 
produce actions that yield desirable outcomes.  Second, once a situated conceptualization is 
constructed to support situated action, it is superimposed on long-term memory, making it available 
for use in future situations.  In this manner, habitual conceptual patterns for processing familiar 
situations become conditioned in the cognitive system.  Third, as future situations are encountered, 
they activate relevant situated conceptualizations in memory that produce anticipatory inferences via 
multimodal simulation.  As a consequence, past situational experiences play significant roles in 
situated action, especially in familiar situations.  Finally, when people imagine situations that aren’t 
present—recollecting the past, assessing counterfactuals to the present, projecting themselves into the 
future—they simulate these events as situated conceptualizations, again drawing on memories of past 
situational experiences. 
2.1. The Brain As a Situation Processing Architecture (BASPA).  Most basically, we 
define a situation as a setting where agents encounter other agents, objects, and events, which 
activate goals, affect, and bodily states, leading to actions and outcomes.  Although other kinds of 
situations exist, we focus on these basic situations here. 
From the situated conceptualization perspective, the brain’s most basic function is to 
process situations, both in the present and when representing non-present situations.  Because 
staying alive and being successful depends on comprehending perceived and simulated situations 
correctly, making accurate inferences about what is likely to happen, and acting effectively to 
produce desirable outcomes, the brain’s architecture has evolved to support these essential 
functions.  One hypothesis about this architecture is that it contains two basic kinds of neural 
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systems:  (a) systems that process the elements of situations, and (b) systems that integrate these 
elements into broader patterns—situated conceptualizations—to support comprehension, 
prediction, and action.2 
2.2.  Situational elements.  First, consider systems that process the elements of situations 
in BASPA.  What might these elements be?  Decades of research on thematic roles in language 
(19,20) and frame structure in cognitive science (21–25) suggest the following kinds of situational 
elements (indicated next in italics):  Typically, situations occur in a physical setting, with agents 
present (at least oneself and often others), performing actions on objects (including people) to 
produce desired outcomes.  Not only does the physical world contribute elements to a situation, so 
does the rich milieu of internal experience, including self-relevance (e.g., goals, values, norms, 
identities), which initiates emotion and motivation, often accompanied by various forms of 
mentalizing (e.g., evaluation, prediction).  These internal states are central to situations, providing 
the personal meaning that makes them significant.  Viewing situated action as only the external 
elements of situations misses the important contributions from internal states that drive situated 
action and make it meaningful.  Basic elements of internal experience—self-relevance, emotion, 
motivation, and mentalizing—complement external situational elements—settings, agents, actions, 
objects, and outcomes.3 
Besides emerging repeatedly as basic building blocks across the cognitive sciences, these 
situational elements are also likely to reflect well-established networks in the brain.  Much evidence 
demonstrates, for example, that the brain contains distributed networks for processing:  (a) an 
agent’s current setting (parietal lobe, parahippocampal gyrus, retrosplenial cortex), (b) objects in the 
setting (the ventral stream), (c) other agents who are present (temporal poles, FFA, mPFC, PCC, 
STG, EBA), (d) self-relevance (mPFC, PCC), (e) physical actions in the environment (motor and 
somatosensory cortices, cerebellum, basal ganglia), and (f) a wide variety of internal responses to 
physical situations, including emotion, motivation, and mentalizing (mPFC, OFC, lPFC, ACC, 
insula, amygdala, PCC). 
From the BASPA perspective, this collective set of networks constitutes an architecture for 
continuously processing the elements of current situations.  As situations come and go over time, 
each of these networks produces a continuous stream of perceptual experiences (qualia) for its 
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respective situational content, along with corresponding conceptual interpretations of this content 
(categorizations).  The network that processes settings, for example, produces a continuous stream of 
perceptual and conceptual information about current settings.  Analogously, the networks that 
process objects, self-relevance, and emotion, produce continuous streams of perceptual and 
conceptual information about the objects present, their self-relevance, and the emotion experienced in 
response to them.  Over time, each of these systems provides a continuous informational ‘feed’—
both perceptual and conceptual—about its respective situational elements.  In a similar manner, 
simulations of non-present situations are reenacted within the same situation processing architecture.4 
Finally, we assume that BASPA feeds are processed in two manners (15,16).  First, BASPA 
feeds enter consciousness and working memory where they are integrated into a coherent perceptual 
state of the current situation, along with a conceptual interpretation of it.  Second, BASPA feeds 
function as cues to activate situational patterns in long-term memory that help process the current 
situation.  As a situational memory becomes active, it in turn becomes implemented as a simulation 
in the BASPA architecture, perhaps being superimposed on the current situation. 
2.3. Integrating situational elements into meaningful configurations.  As just described, 
BASPA produces a collective conceptualization of the elements present either in the current 
situation or in the simulation of a non-present situation.  Without integrating these elements 
relationally, however, relatively little understanding of the situation is achieved.  If, for example, a 
muffin is perceived in a coffeehouse, preceded by hunger and followed by consumption, no 
understanding exists of why hunger and consumption co-occurred with the muffin. 
To establish more complete understanding, it is obviously necessary to relate situational 
elements to one another meaningfully.  As we suggest later, the human ability to establish 
meaningful relations between situational elements is so flexible, productive, and open that it may 
be difficult, if not impossible, to characterize it fully.  Essentially any combination of situational 
elements could potentially be integrated.  Nevertheless, it is perhaps useful to note basic forms of 
relational integration that occur during the conceptual processing that supports situated action. 
Arguably, the relational structure of goal-directed action may be the most basic way that 
organisms (not only humans) organize situational experience.  Such structure has played central 
roles across disciplines for decades, including theories of conditioning, problem solving, and 
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narrative (28–32).  As an example, imagine seeing food, activating the goal to consume it, and 
becoming motivated by desire to do so, followed by eating the food and feeling satisfied.  In this 
situation, its elements include an object, an agent, a goal, a motivation, an action, and an outcome, 
all categorized by the respective distributed networks for processing situational elements.  An 
underlying relational structure makes this set of elements coherent and meaningful, including:  (a) 
the relation between the object (food) and a goal that comes to mind (to consume the food), (b) the 
relation between the goal and the motivation to act that follows (desire), (c) the relation between 
the motivation and the action that it produces (eating), and (d) the relation between the action and 
the outcome that follows (satisfaction).  In general, consumption situations of all sorts can be 
viewed as organizing relevant situational elements around basic relations associated with goal-
directed action, as can many kinds of situations associated with other kinds of situated action. 
Causal chains offer another basic kind of relational structure in situations.  When too much 
rain falls, this can cause rivers and lakes to flood, which can cause streets, houses, and schools to 
be under water, which can cause structural damage.  Speech acts offer further basic forms of 
relational structure in human language situations (33–35).  In a request, for example, a speaker 
holds a mental state about a desired outcome, and produces an utterance that hopefully motivates a 
listener to act on the speaker’s behalf.  Should the listener be willing, the desired outcome is 
achieved.  In this kind of situation, the relevant relations include the speaker and listener holding 
various mental states, the speaker making an utterance, the listener comprehending it, the listener 
acting, and an outcome resulting.  In all these cases, situations become coherent and meaningful as 
the result of agents superimposing relational structure on relevant situational elements. 
3.  Concepts for Situational Elements vs. Situational Integrations 
From the perspective just described, two important kinds of concepts emerge to support 
situated action:  (a) concepts that represent situational elements, (b) concepts that integrate 
situational elements (15,18). 
3.1. Concepts for situational elements.  Again, from the BASPA perspective, the brain 
contains networks that process the elements of situations, with the feed from each network 
including perceptual qualia about its elements and conceptualizations of them.  We propose that 
concepts for situational elements constitute the conceptual output of these networks.  The setting 
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network, for example, produces conceptualizations of settings, such as home, office, and street.  
Similarly, the object network produces conceptualizations of objects, such as sofa, computer, and 
car; the action network produces conceptualizations of actions, such as sit, search, and drive.  
Networks that process internal states similarly produce streams of concepts on their feeds.  The self-
relevance network, for example, produces conceptualizations of goals (e.g., satiation, warmth, 
safety), along with conceptualizations of values, norms, and identities (e.g., honest, friendly, 
helpful).  For every network in BASPA that processes a kind of situational element, concepts 
develop within the network to categorize instances of the element. 
3.2. Concepts for situational integrations.  Conversely, concepts for situational integrations 
develop to inter-relate situational elements relevant to comprehending situations, predicting likely 
events, and acting effectively to produce desired outcomes.  Because so many kinds of integrations 
are possible, many different kinds of situational integrations develop (as discussed in more detail 
later).  As also argued later, establishing concepts for situational integrations provides agents with 
leverage in situated action, supporting successful goal achievement.  For decades, researchers have 
noted the importance of relational concepts in human cognition, similar to our notion of integrative 
concepts here (19,21–23).  The importance of thematic associates for abstract concepts is also 
consistent with our proposal that many abstract concepts integrate the elements of situations (9,36). 
3.3. Concrete and abstract content in situational integrations.  Interestingly, situational 
integrations appear to range from being relatively ‘concrete’ to relatively ‘abstract.’  Even the 
more concrete integrations, however, often exhibit considerable abstractness.  Consider the 
situational integration associated with dining, which typically integrates a dining setting (e.g., 
kitchen, cafe), with relevant objects (food, dishware, cutlery) and relevant actions (e.g., eating, 
drinking).  Notably, however, dining also integrates a variety of internal states including goals 
(e.g., become satiated), values (e.g., support sustainability), norms (e.g., politeness), motivation 
(e.g., hunger), and emotion (e.g., pleasure).  When the social element of dining is further 
considered, the abstract side of these situations becomes still more pronounced, integrating the 
mental states of others, together with communication and other forms of social interaction. 
Even what might seem like a completely ‘concrete’ situational integration can easily become 
‘abstract.’  Consider hammering.  Although this might appear to be a very concrete activity (e.g., 
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integrating a swinging motion, a hammer, a nail, and two boards), it typically includes a goal (e.g., 
attach something to a wall), and could easily include emotion (e.g., senses of accomplishment and 
power, fear of smashing one’s finger), and social interaction (e.g., guilt at annoying one’s neighbors 
with the racket). 
Conversely, some situational integrations might seem almost completely abstract, but 
nevertheless actually be quite concrete as well.  Consider the sense of truth associated with 
producing accurate statements about the world (26).  Imagine that someone claims it’s snowing 
outside on a late summer day, and another person who just came in from outside confirms, “That’s 
the truth!”  Here, truth refers to the first speaker’s claim being an accurate representation of the 
world.  Although truth might seem relatively abstract, it links together many concrete aspects of the 
situation, including a speaker’s utterance embedded in a social interaction, along with reference to a 
perceived physical situation that matches the utterance’s mentally represented meaning. 
Emotion concepts similarly integrate both abstract and concrete situational content.   On the 
one hand, they often seem relatively abstract, referring to internal mental states, such as love or fear.  
On the other, they typically integrate mental states with emotion-eliciting stimuli in the world (e.g., 
babies, spiders), along with physical actions and outcomes (e.g., approach, avoidance, reward, harm), 
and bodily states (e.g., arousal, hyperventilation).  Not only has this mixture of abstract and concrete 
content been demonstrated frequently in specific experiments (18,37), it is also commonly documented 
in meta-analyses of neural activity during emotion (38–40). 
As all these examples illustrate, close examination of just about any situational integration 
reveals both concrete and abstract content.  Concrete content generally comes from the external 
elements of situations, including settings, objects, physical agents, physical actions, and physical 
outcomes.  Indeed, when abstract concepts are processed in the context of visual scenes, more 
activations can occur in visual and other sensory-motor areas than for concrete concepts processed in 
the same scenes (41).  In contrast, abstract content generally comes from processing the internal 
elements of situations, including self-relevance, emotion, motivation, and mentalizing.  Additionally, 
abstract content emerges from the relations that integrate situational elements, both external and 
internal. 
3.4.  Revisiting the concrete vs. abstract distinction.  In the literature, a concept is 
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typically categorized as ‘concrete’ if its referents are bounded physical entities perceptible in the 
external world, such as dogs, apples, and chairs (42,43).  Operationally, concrete concepts are 
usually defined as being above some threshold on a self-report scale of ‘concreteness,’ as just 
defined theoretically (e.g., the MRC psycholinguistic data base; 35, 36, but see 34).  In contrast to 
concrete concepts, abstract concepts are usually defined negatively as not being bounded physical 
entities perceptible in the external world, and respectively, as being below some scale-threshold for 
concreteness.  Notably, these definitions actually do not offer much insight into the nature of 
concrete versus abstract concepts.  In particular, the negative definition of abstract concepts only 
describes what they are not—it says nothing about what they are.  For the purpose of the discussion 
to follow, we will refer to these standard definitions of concrete and abstract concepts in the 
literature as concrete-LIT and abstract-LIT. 
From the perspective of situated conceptualization, the traditional distinction between 
concrete-LIT and abstract-LIT concepts is not particularly useful.  Part of the problem, again, is the 
implicit assumption that all we need to understand about concepts is what becomes active when they 
are cued in isolation.  From this limited perspective, concrete-LIT and abstract-LIT concepts simply 
activate different kinds of information in the cognitive system (e.g., perceptual vs. non-perceptual). 
If we assume instead that the fundamental purpose of concepts is to process situations in 
support of effective goal-directed action, then the distinction between concrete-LIT and abstract-
LIT concepts becomes largely irrelevant.  Concrete-LIT concepts no longer seem so concrete when 
viewed as elements of larger patterns that support situated action —situated conceptualizations—
with these patterns typically including internal situational elements and relations between 
situational elements.  Even the most concrete-LIT concepts, such as a chair, have an abstract 
character from the situated perspective, once internal aspects of typical chair situations are included 
in representing the concept.  Because chairs are typically associated with goals (resting), motivation 
(fatigue), emotion (comfort), and mentalizing (mind wandering), they clearly have ‘abstract’ 
elements.  Additionally, adding the relations that integrate the external and internal elements of 
chair situations makes them even more ‘abstract.’ 
Conversely, abstract-LIT concepts no longer seem so abstract when viewed as parts of 
situated conceptualizations.  As we saw earlier, abstract-LIT concepts such as truth and fear 
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typically operate in the context of complex situations, contributing internal elements on the one 
hand, while integrating these internal elements with external elements on the other. 
As these examples illustrate, the traditional concrete-LIT vs. abstract-LIT distinction 
artificially divides situated cognition into idealized bits and pieces of each type, omitting the 
critical dependence each has upon the other.  Rather than being processed in isolation, diverse 
concepts typically participate together in the representation and processing of complex situations.  
Furthermore, the negative definition of abstract-LIT concepts as not being bounded physical 
entities perceptible in the external world is again not as informative as a positive definition should 
be.  Finally, the assumption that abstract-LIT concepts are not bounded to perceptible entities is 
generally misleading, given that referents in the Visual World Paradigm can become more 
accessible when cued by abstract-LIT than by concrete-LIT words (9).  We later address further 
cases of abstract-LIT words activating concrete content. 
Thus, we propose an alternative account of concrete and abstract concepts from the 
perspective of the Situated Conceptualization framework, which we will refer to as the concrete-SC 
vs. abstract-SC distinction.  From this perspective, we will illustrate how viewing the brain as a 
situation processing architecture (BASPA) offers a different perspective on the concrete-abstract 
distinction.  Not only does this account offer a theoretically motivated distinction between concrete-
SC and abstract-SC concepts, it also offers a positive definition of abstract-SC concepts. 
Specifically, we propose that concrete-SC concepts originate in BASPA’s networks for 
processing external elements of situations, including settings, objects, agents, external actions, and 
external outcomes.  In each case, the respective concrete-SC concepts emerge from the continual 
feeds that relevant BASPA networks produce as they process and conceptualize the elements of 
external situations. 
Conversely, we propose that abstract-SC concepts originate in two ways:  First, one kind 
of abstract-SC concept emerges from BASPA’s networks for processing internal elements of 
situations, including emotion, motivation, mentalizing, and self-relevance (e.g., goals, values, 
norms, identity).  As situations are processed, these concepts emerge from the continual feeds that 
relevant BASPA networks produce while processing elements of an individual’s internal milieu. 
The second kind of abstract-SC concept is one that integrates situation elements, both 
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external and internal.  We assume that the relational structure integrating situational elements is 
relatively abstract, not concrete, being represented internally, not externally; in the sense that the 
relations integrating situations only exist internally as constructions in working and long-term 
memory, rather than as physical entities in the world.  As situational elements are processed 
together in working memory, representations of these processing episodes become increasingly 
established in long-term memory.  As a consequence, entrenched integrations of familiar 
situations result.  Later we offer a tentative account of how this integrative structure might emerge 
within the BASPA framework, utilizing the brain’s association areas. 
As we just saw, it’s possible to distinguish concrete-SC and abstract-SC concepts within the 
situated conceptualization framework.  Nevertheless, we increasingly doubt whether terms like 
‘concrete’ and ‘abstract’ are ultimately useful and informative in describing concepts.  We further 
worry that such a distinction leads to the over-simplification associated with the concrete-LIT vs. 
abstract-LIT distinction described earlier.  For these reasons, we think that it might be advantageous 
to distinguish concepts in other ways that avoid these problems, and that instead are theoretically-
motivated, providing mechanistic accounts of how different kinds of concepts originate. 
Specifically, we suggest replacing the traditional concrete-LIT vs. abstract-LIT distinction 
with two other distinctions central to the situated conceptualization framework:  (a) the distinction 
between external vs. internal elements of situations, (b) the distinction between situation elements 
vs. situation integrations.   A further corollary is that external situational elements, internal 
situational elements, and situation integrations are rarely processed in isolation under ecological 
conditions, but instead are typically processed together to support situated action.  As a result, 
concepts become integrated into large conceptual patterns—situated conceptualizations—that 
support the processing of familiar situations. 
Clearly, major differences between different kinds of concepts still remain within this 
framework.  At a broad level, the concepts that represent external situation elements, internal 
situation elements, and situational integrations must vary considerably.  Furthermore, major 
differences obviously exist within each of these general domains as well.  For external situational 
elements, concepts for settings, objects, agents, physical actions, and physical outcomes differ 
widely, as do emotions, motivations, mentalizing, and self-relevance for internal situational elements.  
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And as described later, the diversity of situational integrations is limited only by the combinations of 
situational elements that can be inter-related.  Most importantly, the research orientation for 
understanding different concepts from this perspective does not revolve around whether they are 
concrete or abstract, but instead depends on the specific roles they play in processing present and 
non-present situations.  Additionally, each kind of situational element, both external and internal, 
must be understood in its own right, as must concepts for situational integration. 
4.  Using Concepts for Situational Integration to Leverage Situated Action 
Because the basic function of situational integration is to interrelate situational elements, it’s 
not clear how much can be learned from studying concepts for situational integration in isolation.  If 
no situational elements are present to integrate, it’s not clear what would become active for these 
concepts and how they would be processed.  Instead, concepts for situational integration may only 
become fully engaged when at least some elements of a relevant situation are present, such that 
something exists to integrate.  Consistent with this conclusion, abstract-LIT concepts are processed 
more effectively when relevant contexts are present than when they’re not (46).  Furthermore, the 
brain areas that become active for abstract-LIT concepts change dramatically when processed deeply 
in relevant contexts (41).  Similar to language processing in the Visual World Paradigm, conceptual 
processing changes significantly when coupled with relevant situations. 
To the extent that this account is correct, what are the functions of conceptual integration, as 
concepts for situational integration engage with the external and internal elements of situations?  In 
general, we suggest that this engagement provides significant leverage on performing situated 
action effectively.  Specifically, we propose that engaging concepts for situational integration 
supports three important functions:  (a) comprehending situations, (b) predicting events, and (c) 
performing appropriate actions that produce desirable outcomes.  We address each role of 
situational integration in turn. 
First consider the comprehension of situations. Understanding what is happening currently 
in a situation is the first step towards predicting what could happen later and acting effectively.  To 
the extent that perceivers can integrate the perceived external and internal elements of a situation 
into a meaningful pattern, they can comprehend it.  On seeing people sitting around a table with 
food on it, for example, perceivers can comprehend the situation if they integrate its elements 
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using integrative concepts for eating, dining, etc.  Similarly, on seeing someone standing next to a 
sink by a stack of dirty dishes with the water running, perceivers can comprehend the situation if 
they integrate its elements using integrative concepts for washing, cleaning up, etc.  Understanding 
all these everyday situations requires integrating their situational elements.  In many situations, 
integration is likely to revolve around basic goal-directed action, where situational elements trigger 
goals, value, norms, and identities from which motivation, action, and outcomes follow.  Similarly, 
in social situations, integration is likely to revolve around basic interactive patterns, such 
conveying information, making requests, demonstrating procedures, showing affection, etc.  As 
people become increasingly expert in social, professional, and recreational domains, their ability to 
comprehend them grows as a function of the concepts they possess for integrating their elements 
(e.g., understanding dating rituals, grasping a trial lawyer’s strategy, watching a baseball game). 
The situational patterns that support comprehension also support prediction.  Perhaps the 
primary difference is that comprehension typically involves integrating perceived situational 
elements (both external and internal), whereas prediction involves inferring the likely later presence 
of situational elements not yet perceived.  On seeing pizza at a party, for example, perceivers can 
predict how likely it is to taste, and how enjoyable eating it would be.  On seeing someone down 
several drinks quickly at a bar, perceivers might predict that intoxicated speech and uninhibited 
behavior will follow.  Within the situated conceptualization framework, pattern completion 
inferences underlie these predictions.  As some external and internal elements of a situation are 
perceived, they activate relevant situated conceptualizations in memory whose integrative concepts 
have integrated similar situations in the past.  Once active, a situated conceptualization is 
superimposed on the current situation via multimodal simulation, within the same situation 
processing architecture used to process the current situation.  To the extent that this superimposition 
includes simulations of situational elements not yet present, it predicts their possible occurrence. 
Effective situated action similarly results from pattern completion inferences.  Besides 
predicting situational elements not yet present, situated conceptualizations that become active 
suggest and implement actions likely to be appropriate and effective in the current situation.  On 
seeing pizza at a party, for example, inferences about eating the pizza become relevant, which may 
then be executed.  Similarly, on watching someone become intoxicated at a bar, inferences about 
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their mental state and subsequent behavior may implement relevant actions, such as joining in or 
staying clear.  To the extent that perceivers have acquired concepts that integrate a situation’s 
elements, they can comprehend and predict situations accurately, and produce effective actions 
yielding desirable outcomes.  In these ways, concepts for situational integration provide leverage 
in handling situations successfully. 
More generally, developing expertise in a domain may typically only be possible once agents 
possess a sophisticated and relatively complete set of situationally-relevant integrative concepts that 
support comprehension, prediction, and action.  Consider the concepts necessary for being a 
successful trial lawyer.  To comprehend what is occurring in a trial situation, a lawyer must know 
concepts for prosecute, defend, law, felony, among many others.  To predict what will happen, a 
lawyer must also know how various concepts are related, such as the evidence determines the verdict, 
and in turn, the verdict predicts the sentence.  To act appropriately in a trial situation, lawyers and 
judges must understand concepts like objection, sustain, and overrule, and then be able to carry out 
the associated actions correctly.  As these examples illustrate, knowing the relevant integrative 
concepts in a domain and how to apply them appropriately in relevant situations is essential for 
successful comprehension, prediction, and action.  Doing so provides leverage in performing 
effective situated action.  Without integrative concepts, sophisticated action would not be possible. 
Again, simply studying concepts for situational integration in isolation, as cued by their 
linguistic labels, doesn’t allow them to fully manifest themselves. Only when these concepts are 
engaged with the elements of relevant situations—providing leverage for situated action—do they 
become fully revealed. 
5. Grounding the Relations that Integrate Situational Elements 
A key issue for this account concerns the relations in abstract-SC concepts that integrate 
situational elements.  Are these relations represented in some kind of amodal symbolic manner, 
such as argument-value structures in linguistic syntax, predicate calculus expressions in logic, or 
frames in programming languages?  Or might they arise in a more grounded way?  If so, what is 
the nature of this grounding? 
5.1.  Grounding integrative relations in temporal co-occurrence.  Our hypothesis is that 
the relations underlying integrative concepts both result from and represent co-occurrences between 
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situational elements.  Because many co-occurrences exist between pairs of situational elements, 
various factors may contribute to making certain important co-occurrences salient (47).  Biological 
influences, for example, could naturally draw attention to certain kinds of temporal co-occurrences 
that have been evolutionarily significant.  Or certain kinds of co-occurrences could occur more 
frequently than others, leading to increased attention.  Finally, language, culture, and social 
interaction may orient attention to culturally relevant co-occurrences, thereby making them salient. 
To see these possibilities, consider some examples.  On perceiving certain stimuli, a sense 
of self-relevance subsequently becomes active, such as a goal, value, norm, or identity.  Seeing 
pizza at a party, for example, might activate the goal of consuming it.  Or seeing someone steal 
jewelry in a store might cause values and norms associated with honesty and theft to become 
salient.  Or hearing music from one’s adolescence might activate a sense of cultural identity.  In 
each case, an associative relation develops between a stimulus and a sense of self-relevance that 
later causes perception of the stimulus to activate self-relevance as a pattern completion inference. 
A wide variety of other important integrative relations in situations could emerge similarly.  
Consider, for example, relations between self-relevance and subsequent emotion and motivation.  
On seeing someone steal jewelry from a store, activating the norm that stealing is bad could 
initiate anger and other negative emotions.  Similarly, seeing pizza and activating the potential 
goal of eating it could initiate a motivational state of desire, or perhaps the motivational state to 
restrain eating for the sake of health. 
In the same manner, relations between motivations and actions, and between actions and 
outcomes could be captured via temporal co-occurrences.  To the extent that specific actions, such 
as eating or dieting, follow from particular motivational states, the actions come to be viewed as 
resulting from the respective motivational states.  Similarly, to the extent that specific outcomes, 
such as satiation and good health, follow from particular actions, these outcomes come to be 
viewed as resulting from the respective actions. 
Notably, these relations may typically remain relatively implicit, not being labeled or 
represented explicitly (although they could be).  By virtue of simply attending to situation elements 
that co-occur temporally, an implicit relation becomes constructed between them in memory.  On 
later occasions, perceiving one element activates the other, via the associative relation that has been 
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established between them.  Rather than explicitly labeling the conceptual content of these relations 
as ‘self-relevance’ or ‘motivation,’ their content remains implicit.  Self-relevance, for example, is 
represented implicitly when an external stimulus activates a personally relevant goal (e.g., seeing a 
chair activates the goal of sitting).  Similarly, motivation is represented implicitly when certain 
internal states activate instrumental actions (e.g., feeling hungry and eating a sandwich). 
In general, temporal co-occurrence, together with other factors that make co-occurrences 
salient, could potentially ground the relations that integrate situational elements.  As particular pairs 
of situational elements are perceived as co-occurring together during comprehension, prediction, and 
action, they become established as integrative relations in the respective situated conceptualizations.  
To the extent that the same general kinds of relations become important across many situated 
conceptualizations, they could develop increased in importance across domains of situated action. 
Rather than assuming that amodal structures represent these relations, qualia associated with 
the respective situational elements becoming active together represent them.  Because these temporal 
co-occurrence qualia are perceived, they offer grounding for the underlying relations.  In other words, 
relations between situational elements are represented by internal perceptions of their temporally 
dependent co-occurrence.  We further assume that different kinds of co-occurrence relations reflect the 
different kinds of situational elements they integrate, producing diverse relations in the process (e.g., 
relations between stimuli and self-relevance, relations between motivations and actions, relations 
between actions and outcomes).  Finally, this approach explains why it is so difficult to establish a 
fixed set of relations.  Because perceiving co-occurrence between so many different kinds of 
situational elements is possible, an indefinitely large set of co-occurrence relations exists.5 
5.2.  The neural substrates of integrative relations.  If the temporal co-occurrence 
hypothesis has merit, it would further require a plausible neural basis.  One possibility is that the 
brain’s association areas support this function, with different association areas coding different 
types of co-occurrence relations (47–49).  Consider again co-occurrence relations between stimuli 
and self-relevance.  It has become increasingly well established that the perception of objects in 
the ventral stream triggers predictions about the value of these objects in orbitofrontal cortex 
(50,51).  One possibility is that association areas in the anterior temporal lobes and/or in medial 
prefrontal cortex integrate the temporal co-occurrence of object and value representations.  
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Similarly, medial prefrontal cortex could further mediate the co-occurrence of object and value 
representations with action representations in motor areas, as could mid-cingulate cortex.  
Association areas along the cortical midline and in the angular gyrus could further integrate self-
relevance with settings and outcomes.  Similarly, association areas in the supramarginal gyrus of 
the parietal lobe could link objects with the actions used to manipulate them along particular 
spatial trajectories.  Finally, middle temporal areas could link auditory word forms with their 
multimodal semantic representations. 
Similar to the proposal that association areas contain conjunctive neurons (47,48,52), the 
idea here is that conjunctive neurons come to encode the temporal co-occurrence of situational 
elements processed in adjoining networks.  Thus, when one element in a relation becomes active 
(e.g., an object), it activates a temporal co-occurrence relation in a relevant association area (e.g., 
anterior temporal lobe), which in turn activates other elements in the relation (e.g., a goal).  To the 
extent that these latter elements participate in further relations mediated by other association areas, 
they in turn activate additional situational elements.  In this manner, perceiving one element of a 
situated conceptualization could activate an entire situated conceptualization distributed across the 
brain.  On seeing pizza, for example, the initial visual representation could activate reward 
prediction areas in orbitofrontal cortex via association areas in the anterior temporal lobe, which in 
turn activate action representations via association areas in medial prefrontal areas and mid-
cingulate gyrus, which in turn activate spatial and motion elements via supramarginal gyrus. 
In essence, this account assumes that the ‘skeleton’ of an abstract-SC concept for 
situational integration contains a collection of implicit temporal-occurrence relations in relevant 
association areas.  Consider an example.  For the integrative concept, prosecute, a collection of 
implicit relations in association areas points to systems that process relevant situational elements 
(e.g., court room, lawyer, defendant, crime, evidence, etc.).  When the word “prosecute” is 
encountered in isolation, it begins to activate the variety of implicit relations associated with it in 
association areas.  If a relevant situation is not present, only implicit representations of these 
relations become active not bound to (associated with) active situational elements.  If, however, a 
situation with relevant situation elements is already present, this constrains the activation of 
implicit relations to those that bind these elements, thereby facilitating processing. 
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To the extent that this account is true, it further implicates internal states in the conceptual 
processing of situations, with constructed representations of temporal co-occurrences between 
situational elements becoming part of how situations are processed conceptually.  By activating 
these co-occurrence relations as a situation is processed, agents perceive relations between 
situational elements that originate in top-down knowledge, rather than in the bottom-up signal. 
6.  Implications of this Account 
In this section, we illustrate how the situated conceptualization framework described so far 
explains a variety of findings in the literature on concrete-LIT vs. abstract-LIT concepts.  Because the 
findings we address often adopted the traditional distinction between concrete-LIT vs. abstract-LIT 
concepts, we’ll use this distinction to describe them, while also using the concrete-SC vs. abstract-SC 
distinction when presenting alternative accounts from our perspective. 
6.1.  The importance of language for abstract-LIT concepts.  Since Paivio’s (53,54) Dual 
Code Theory, it has been clear that language is especially important for abstract-LIT concepts.  
Reviews of neuroimaging confirm this importance, showing that abstract-LIT concepts heavily 
utilize language areas in the brain (when processed in isolation; 46).  Recent reviews further 
document the important roles that language plays in abstract-LIT concepts (42,56,57). 
From our perspective, language is important for abstract-LIT concepts because it is 
essential for specifying an abstract-LIT concept’s referents.  In contrast to concrete-LIT concepts, 
it’s typically not possible to point to the referent of an abstract-LIT concept physically (e.g., as 
when pointing to referents of chairs).  Because the referents of abstract-LIT concepts tend to be 
non-perceived, non-bounded, and non-physical, pointing to them is not possible.  Similarly, from 
the situated conceptualization perspective, abstract-SC concepts refer, first, to internal situational 
elements, and second, to the internal integration of external and internal situational elements, with 
both not being pointed to easily.  Specifying them in some other way is required. 
Language provides a natural means of doing so.  Using language for propositional attitudes 
enables referring to internal situational elements, such as, “I want to eat” (goal), “I’m feeling happy” 
(emotion), “I’m hungry” (motivation), and “I’m thinking about taking a holiday” (mentalizing).  Using 
relational forms of language further enables reference to integrated situational content, such as, “I ate 
doughnuts at work to make myself feel happier, not because I was hungry,” or “What you said was 
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true because it accurately described the state of the world.”  Because of language’s powerful ability to 
integrate situational elements with hierarchically-embedded argument-value structures, it becomes 
possible to specify the integrated situational elements to which a situated conceptualization refers. 
Rather than pointing to the referents of abstract-SC concepts with their hands, people refer 
to them with linguistic expressions.  Not only can these expressions point out internal referents 
that people experience—both elemental and integrative—they can be used to teach children 
abstract-SC concepts by specifying the relevant internal elements and integrated elements 
linguistically.  As a consequence, language becomes highly associated with abstract-SC concepts, 
strongly engaging the brain’s language system when they are processed. 
Our approach also naturally explains how people learn abstract-SC concepts via language 
indirectly from other cultural members, rather than directly from experience (42,56,57).  Because 
language specifies the content and structure of abstract-SC concepts (both elemental and integrative), 
it can be used to define new concepts not yet experienced.  A critical factor from our perspective, 
however, is that participants must be able to represent a non-present situation to which they can apply 
a new abstract-SC concept as it’s defined for them via language.  We assume that people activate 
situated conceptualizations from memory for this purpose, or construct novel ones needed under 
linguistic guidance.  Once the respective situations are simulated, new internal elements and 
situational integrations can be defined with respect to them. 
6.2.  The concreteness of abstract-SC concepts.  Although language may be essential for 
learning and using abstract-SC concepts, it is not sufficient.  As suggested earlier, abstract-SC 
concepts that implement situational integrations only become fully active when engaged with 
situations, integrating relevant situational elements, both external and internal.  Consistent with this 
proposal, visual areas can become more active for abstract-LIT concepts than for concrete-LIT 
concepts, when both kinds of concepts were embedded in situations (41).  Other examples of 
abstract-LIT concepts engaging concrete-LIT information have also been reported (9,42,58). 
As suggested earlier, abstract-SC concepts develop a concrete dimension after being 
applied to situations.  Abstract-SC concepts for internal situational elements typically co-occur 
with concrete-SC concepts for external situational elements, which all become integrated via 
abstract-SC concepts for situation integration.  As a consequence, situated conceptualizations 
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containing all three types of concepts are constructed continuously to process current situations, 
becoming subsequently superimposed in memory.  On later receiving a cue for an abstract-SC 
concept (either an internal situational element, or a situational integration), a situated 
conceptualization may become active that includes external situational elements as pattern 
completion inferences.  If so, then the abstract-SC concept develops a concrete dimension. 
6.3.  Effects of context availability.  The context availability hypothesis first proposes that 
context is important for processing both concrete-LIT and abstract-LIT concepts (42,46).  This 
basic assumption is highly consistent with our view that concepts of all kinds develop to support 
situated action, and operate together—not in isolation—to support comprehension, prediction, and 
action in situations.  The context availability hypothesis further proposes that context is especially 
relevant for abstract-LIT concepts, given that they tend to activate relevant situations less easily 
than do concrete-LIT concepts. 
From our perspective, concrete-SC concepts are situational elements that often form highly 
predictable patterns for typical external situations, including settings, objects, agents, and physical 
actions.  Once one part of a pattern becomes active, it quickly activates other parts via pattern 
completion inference, thereby activating an external situation.  Conversely, abstract-SC concepts 
only manifest themselves when relevant external elements of a situation are present.  When an 
external situation isn’t present, abstract-SC concepts don’t become fully engaged and don’t reveal 
themselves.  This proposal appears especially true for abstract-SC concepts that integrate situations.  
Without external situational elements to integrate, these concepts don’t have the input that they 
require to operate.  As a consequence, these concepts’ temporal co-occurrence relations don’t 
become fully specified, such that they remain vague and not fully activated. 
Concepts for internal situational elements may also typically require external situations for 
their operation, given that they often represent internal responses to external situations.  When 
what produced an internal situational element is not known (e.g., for an emotion), the internal 
element processed in isolation may not make much sense, and so is only processed superficially.  
For these abstract-SC concepts, too, it appears essential to study them in the context of relevant 
situations. 
6.4.  The activation of broad situational content for all kinds of concepts.  Much work 
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from the feature listing paradigm demonstrates that people generate broad situational content when 
producing features for specific concepts (59–63).  When people generate features for concrete-LIT 
concepts, such as chair, dog, and banana, they typically generate diverse situational information that 
goes beyond simple features of the respective objects, including internal situational elements and 
situation integrations.  Conversely, when people generate features of abstract-LIT concepts, they 
typically generate external elements of the situations to which they apply. 
The situated conceptualization framework naturally explains these two findings.   Because 
both concrete-LIT and abstract-LIT concepts are typically processed in situations, they become 
integrated in situated conceptualizations with other relevant elemental and integrative concepts.  
Later, when concrete-LIT and abstract-LIT concepts are cued, relevant situated conceptualizations 
become active, producing broad situational information as pattern completion inferences.  In this 
manner, the situated conceptualization framework naturally explains the diverse situational 
information typically active for concepts, beyond the cues provided. 
6.5.  Diverse kinds of abstract-SC concepts.  It is a humbling exercise to enter a word 
data base and extract all of the abstract-LIT concepts (e.g., going into the MRC data base, and 
filtering concepts below a particular concreteness threshold).  The diversity of abstract-LIT 
concepts is truly remarkable, attesting to the vastness and power of the human conceptual system.  
Explaining this diversity constitutes an obvious challenge. 
Our approach perhaps provides one modest insight into this diversity.  Consider the subset 
of abstract-SC concepts that develop to integrate situational elements.  Because so many types of 
situational elements exist, with a huge space of possible relations between them, many different 
configurations of integrated situational elements become possible.  As a consequence, many 
different kinds abstract-SC concepts develop to perform diverse forms of situational integration.  
Certainly, there must be constraints, principles, and biases associated with the situational 
integrations that these integrated concepts represent.  If so, then one direction for future research is 
to begin establishing them. 
7.  Conclusions 
Because concepts emerge from processing situations, they are best studied in the context of 
situations.  Although we have focused on abstract-SC concepts here, we believe that the same is 
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true of concrete-SC concepts.  What we learn from studying both kinds of concepts in isolation—
especially in shallow processing tasks such as lexical decision—is likely to be limited and possibly 
distorted (again, consider the Visual World paradigm).  We will understand all kinds of concepts 
better when we study them in their natural operating environment—situations. 
We further advocate abandoning the traditional distinction between concrete-LIT and 
abstract-LIT concepts.  This distinction is overly simplistic, focusing on superficial (and 
problematic) differences in perceptual information, and only defining abstract-LIT concepts 
negatively and/or operationally.  Furthermore, the concrete-abstract distinction assumes that all we 
need to know about concepts is what becomes active when they are cued, failing to consider the 
important roles of concepts in situated action.  Because large amounts of situational information 
typically become active for concepts of all types, this suggests that they are typically co-active with 
broad collections of other concepts, both elemental and integrative, to support situated action.  
These patterns further suggest that, not only should we study concepts embedded in relevant 
situations, we also need to theoretically explain the broad situational information that typically 
becomes active for all concepts when processed deeply. 
Finally, we propose that developing a new set of distinctions between concepts—based on 
situated action—may offer useful insights and constraints in understanding concepts as a whole.  
Specifically, we propose that establishing the basic elements of situations, both external and 
internal, will be central to understanding concepts, along with further establishing how these 
elements are integrated to support comprehension, prediction, and action.  We further suggest that 
distributed neural networks process these situational elements in parallel, and that association areas 
play central roles in integrating elements, perhaps via temporal co-occurrence relations (i.e., the 
BASPA framework).  To the extent that this account has any merit, considerable work remains to 
establish situational elements at both the cognitive and neural levels, and to understand the 
association areas that integrate them. 
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Footnotes 
 
1  Although we use the construct of abstract concepts in early sections of this article to make 
contact with current literature (and also the construct of concrete concepts), we drop the 
abstract-concrete distinction in 3.4, arguing that it is no longer useful and should be replaced 
with more specific distinctions. 
2  We have previously referred to situational elements as “local concepts,” and to situational 
integrations as “global concepts” (18).  Because the local-global distinction primarily conveys 
difference in resolution (high vs. low), it misses the important functional distinction that we 
want to capture here, namely, the difference between the elements of situations vs. integrations 
of these elements.  Because integration will later play a central role in how situated 
conceptualizations provide leverage for effective situated action, we shift to this more 
transparent terminology. 
3 We acknowledge that our specific list of situational elements may require refinement and 
revision.  The point here is simply that the situations constituting daily life are likely to contain 
elements along these lines. 
4  From the perspective of Perceptual Symbol Systems, perceptual states (and simulations) are 
processed within the same networks as conceptualizations.  Whereas perceptual states and 
simulations are implemented as the specific states of a BASPA network, conceptualizations are 
implemented as simulators within the same network.  Simulators develop initially from the 
bottom-up accrual of perceptual states (utilizing association areas), and later implement 
specific perceptual states as top-down simulations.(26,27) 
5  Additionally, there is the important issue of distinguishing mere temporal co-occurrence from 
causality and intentionality.  Given consistent patterns of temporal precedence from one 
situational element to another, along with other potential mechanisms such as counterfactuals, 
it seems likely that integrative relations may often develop a causal character. 
